Who said winning hearts and minds

The very detailed RAND study by Paul et al highlights the lessons we should learn by studying the successes and failures of numerous modern insurgencies. Fifteen of the cases involved mixed strategies, which experienced a much higher percentage of success.

Despite this work recognizing that a mixed strategy was generally more successful than a purely military strategy, under what conditions are those mixed strategies most likely to succeed? The RAND team correctly identifies a critical factor for success — the use of a mixed strategy. Yet, there are cases where a mixed strategy was unsuccessful Laos, ; Kampuchea, ; Papua New Guinea, ; and Tajikistan, , and 17 where a mixed strategy was unnecessary.

Winning hearts and minds essentially means convincing the populace that the benefits of supporting the government against the insurgents outweighs the benefits of supporting the insurgents. It may provide security or protect the population so that it does not have to fear the insurgents or fear the government for that matter. It may also include punishment and retribution against the population for supporting the insurgents, at the expense of government forces.

In general, the biggest distinction is that a hearts and minds approach focuses on the population while a conventional military strategy tends to focus on the insurgents. The challenge is that under some circumstances, such a focus on the population may be less effective than a strategy that emphasizes those who are engaged in the fighting. Part of the purpose of this article is to identify some of those circumstances, so that in the future we do not emphasize the wrong type of fight.

There is an assumption that winning hearts and minds is a necessary condition for success in an insurgency. If true, then that means that insurgencies are fundamentally different from conventional wars, in which hearts and minds are rarely the focus. That argument, taken to the next level, suggests that there are different types of insurgencies, and that a strategy of winning hearts and minds may be more effective in those insurgencies that are more about political victory, and less effective in those insurgencies that are more about winning the military contest.

This article focuses on those factors that are largely beyond the control of the government involved in the conflict, it better frames the strategic environment under which the insurgents and counterinsurgents both operate. Because these are largely uncontrollable conditions for the state, it is necessary to identify when these conditions exists, altering the likelihood of success for a COIN approach of winning hearts and minds.

When my findings suggest hearts and minds will be less successful, that does not mean COIN will be ineffective, just that it will be more successful if it focuses on the insurgents rather than the people.

When hearts and minds is likely to be more successful, the specific tactics required to achieve the greatest success still must be identified as we continue to ask these questions and seek greater insight into the phenomenon of insurgency. The U. The more important point is that the political organizations — whether legal or illegal — engage in illegal, violent activities.

It also tends to ignore the possible role of third party intervention, on behalf of either side. This article defines an insurgency as a sustained campaign of extralegal violence, intended to cause or prevent government change. Within insurgencies, groups can fall along either side of a spectrum, depending on the nature of their attacks. Guerrilla groups are those that focus their attacks on combatants — usually the armed forces of the state or of a third party involved in the country such as an occupying power.

In contrast, terrorist groups are those that focus their attacks on non-combatants. This should be a fairly clear distinction, but is really a continuum because groups that primarily targets combatants — and thus, by my definition, would be a guerrilla group — may also occasionally attack civilians.

Likewise, a terrorist group that emphasizes attacks on civilians may occasionally attack combatants. Although there are many factors not addressed here that contribute to the usefulness of a hearts and minds strategy, those identified below emphasize conditions largely beyond the control of the government and its forces.

I discuss each of these in some detail, providing examples of both successful and failed attempts at population-centric approaches given the different conditions. Mao Tse-Tung, leader of the Chinese Communist movement, wrote about the stages of protracted war. During Phase One, when the movement is relatively weak, the group primarily organizes itself in isolated terrain and uses terrorism, both to educate the public and to further mobilize the population.

Phase Two involves fewer attacks on the population and more direct attacks against the government and its armed forces, in what appears to be more guerrilla warfare. This is not a purely linear progression as a movement can move backwards or forwards.

The point is that there is a difference between those movements that have the support of the civilians and those that do not. A hearts and minds strategy is most effective when an insurgency is still in its earliest phase. Support for the movement is low during this phase, not only because it is new, but because the group is attacking the very support base from which it is trying to recruit.

Once a movement progresses to the phase where it uses less terrorism, and focuses more of its attacks on the military forces, the population-centric approach will be much less effective. By this point, not only have the insurgents already gained some attention and support, but because they no longer attack civilians they will have more support from the population than during the previous phase.

Thus, the opportunity to win hearts and minds from potential sympathizers will have already passed. Yet it still clearly engages in attacks against civilians with the intent of causing fear. Because the group is no longer in Phase One, opportunities for success using population-centric approaches are shrinking.

We can focus on Iraqi and foreign populations in an attempt to limit future support and recruits, but unless we can also protect the population under ISIS control, an approach that focuses on winning hearts and minds is unlikely to achieve long-term success.

Insurgencies form for a variety of reasons, with some more common than others during various historical eras. In the case of an independence movement, the group seeks to split from the existing polity and establish a separate state. Finally, counter-revolutionary groups seek a return to some status quo ante. Another is the Afrikaner Resistance Movement in South Africa, after the end of the apartheid government. Independence movements can be unique because they often involves groups of different ethnic or religious identities, rather than the political differences that so often exist in revolutionary movements.

So if one were to seek to win hearts and minds, who is the target population — those who already feel oppressed and better-off on their own, or those who do not want to lose a piece of their national territory? For this reason, it is important to identify the purpose of the insurgencts before adopting any type of population-centric approach. Then, if it is about independence, the demographics of the movement as discussed in more detail below become even more important.

Revolution and counter-revolution both depend on timing and phase as discussed above to determine the degree of popular support for the insurgents. In such situations, who is the target of the hearts and minds campaign? If the differences are ethnic, as opposed to political, then a hearts and minds strategy can work, but only if both sides are willing to compromise less likely if the difference is a religious one.

Even if the difference is political as discussed above, hearts and minds will only work in the early stages, when popular support for the movement is at its lowest level. ISIS combines an independence movement with a counter-revolution. This is the counter-revolution component of ISIS. Because of this combination of goals, a purely population-centric approach will be difficult, and requires us to take a look at demographics. Having established that it is critical to focus on hearts and minds campaigns when the population is under attack, it is also critical to understand which portion of the population fears the insurgents.

The most complex scenario is one where the insurgents are part of a separate ethnic or religious group that targets only those of the majority. This is complicated because of the multiple audiences involved. A simpler scenario, though still difficult, is when an ethnic group attacks both those of the opposing identity as well as those of their own group — commonly those working with the authorities or who are perceived to be disloyal to the cause.

A still simpler scenario involves revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements, in which there are no ethnic or religious differences among the population. In such scenarios, a hearts and minds strategies are the most likely to be effective. Demographics matter not just for the at-risk population, but also for the insurgents and the COIN forces. The scenario most likely to lead to a successful population-centric strategy is when the insurgents are made up of foreign fighters and the COIN forces are entirely domestic.

In such situations, the population is more likely to support the government forces against those viewed as outsiders. We saw the evolution of this in Iraq as local tribes became wary of the foreign fighters and began to provide more support to US and coalition forces, sometimes referred to as the Sunni Awakening.

The most difficult scenario for population-centric approach is when the insurgents are made up of the local population while COIN forces are members of a foreign government.

In such cases, the COIN forces will be viewed as occupiers and will rarely be able to gain the trust of the civilian population, no matter how much effort is put into winning hearts and minds. The various stages of the Iraq conflict illustrate these differences and how shifts to one variable will make hearts and minds more effective. In other words, it was not the adoption of hearts and minds that improved the situation in Iraq, but rather the increased use of Iraqi forces over US forces, and the increased recognition, by the Iraqi people, that many of the insurgents were foreign fighters.

These shifting perceptions happened to coincide with the shift to a more population-centric approach. The demographics of an insurgency can also change. Eric Jardine argues that populations tend to move away from violence, [xxii] which would make population-centric approaches less effective and also less necessary. But a key missing ingredient from his study draws on my previous discussion of whether the insurgents are guerrillas who rely on the people, or terrorist who target the people.

If the people support the insurgents, they are less likely to leave the area. Or, in the case of ISIS, where the insurgents hold territory, people are being prevented from leaving. Which is the appropriate target of a population-centric approach, since the types of policies that will reassure one population may simultaneously weaken the support received from another?

While we tend to view a population-centric approach to COIN as preferable and more humane to an enemy-centric one, it is important to identify those conditions under which each type of approach is more effective than the other. No two insurgencies are the same, and so no COIN approach should be uniform.

This article examines certain conditions that affect the likelihood of success for a population-centric approach. If one accepts the above points, then there are some logical conclusions regarding when a state should follow a hearts and minds approach during an insurgency. Population-centric approaches are most likely to be successful when an insurgency is still in its infancy, as civilians are targeted and looking for protection from the insurgents as well as reasons to oppose the insurgency.

As an insurgency becomes more established, and attacks the population less frequently, an enemy-centric approach or a mixed approach will become more useful. While it still engages in terroristic behavior, especially towards those living under its control, it has the capability and will to engage in direct combat with Iraqi forces.

This means it is no longer simply a terrorist organizations, and requires an approach closer to the enemy-centric side of the spectrum. This does not mean Iraqi and coalition forces should not still attempt to protect the population as well as win over the people, simply that the emphasis of the COIN should be on the enemy forces.

Government approaches must also depend on the goals of the insurgents. A population-centric approach is more suitable against revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements, where a group attempts to alter the system or government from within, and thus would have a dramatic effect on the entire population. Groups fighting for independence have a more limited effect on the society, and thus necessitate a more enemy-centric or mixed approach.

ISIS, despite its rhetoric about religion and the caliphate, is essentially an independence movement, wanting to take and hold territory from Iraq and Syria. This suggests a more enemy-centric approach is in order, which is consistent with the assessment above based on the phase of the ISIS insurgency. But the existence of multiple ethnic or religious audiences will always complicate a population-centric approach. If the insurgents are of a different ethnicity from the population, especially if the insurgents are foreigners, then a population-centric approach can work.

If the insurgents are the same ethnicity as the population, then such an approach will be more difficult, and may require a more enemy-centric approach.

Much of that persists, but ISIS also includes a growing number of Iraqis, meaning that a population-centric approach will be less effective. If the US decides to engage in the fight against ISIS, a population-centric approach may make us feel better and help reduce civilian casualties — though it is still unclear the extent to which that assumption holds true — but the evidence presented here suggests that it will not help put an end to the insurgency.

Instead, a focus on the enemy itself, or at least a mixed approach, will be necessary to achieve the goal of defeating ISIS. The broader lesson is that COIN is like conventional war in at least one way; states need to have a better understanding of their enemy before trying to develop a strategy for defeating that enemy.

Unlike conventional war, there may be insurgencies where winning over the population avoids the need to defeat the enemy on the battlefield. Yet we need more research to better understand when population-centric approaches are most likely to be effective. FM Counterinsurgency Washington, D.

I agree, to the extent that the US has generally failed to connect ends, ways, and means, and has used its COIN doctrine primarily as an operational method to dealing with an enemy it generally fails to understand.

I disagree that COIN can never be a strategy. If a state has specific ends, and ties its ways and means to achieve those ends, then one could have a COIN strategy, but it must also be flexible enough to deal with different types of insurgencies. Though Eland attributes these policies to failure in Malaya because the British ultimately granted the country independence, other scholars points to Malaya as an example of successful COIN, while still others highlight the fact that the British did not rely exclusively on a strategy of winning hearts and minds.

In other words, when a state employs secret and illegal means to protect itself, it is engaged in a type of insurgency. Some scholars refer to this as state terror, which is just another way of saying the state is involved in extralegal violence against its people, over the control of political territory. My preference is to define insurgency by the activities and goals of the group engaged in violence, rather than the actors engaged in the violence.

The implication of this argument is that populations may occasionally need to engage in counterinsurgency efforts against their own state, which also could be either enemy- or population-centric. Unless there is a full-blown army rising up against the state, it will be difficult for the state to engage in discriminate attacks against combatants.

Instead, most examples of state violence tend to be against the population, and thus qualify as terrorism. Therefore, his use of revolutionary war and protracted war are both synonymous with my use of insurgency. Gregory D. He received his Ph. So let me use Kilcullen he, indeed, was my inspiration to follow-up on my two different and distinctive -- counter-insurgency conflict models; those outlined in my comment immediately below:. Kilcullen, in his "Counterinsurgency Redux," noted two different types of counterinsurgencies and two different types of insurgencies.

These classics have colored the modern view of earlier theorists like T. Lawrence, Louis Lyautey and C. Callwell whose works are often seen through the lens of s counterinsurgency.

The insurgent in this instance challenges the status quo; the counter-insurgent seeks to reinforce the state and so defeat the internal challenge. Classical theorists emphasize the problem of recognizing this type of insurgency early. In this "classical" counter-insurgency conflict model "Hold What You Got" , Kilcullen emphasizes that:. Note that in this model, it is the counter-insurgent the foreign expansionist power who a represents "revolutionary change" and who, thus, b "initiatives:".

Such patterns are readily recognizable in historical examples of resistance warfare, but less so in classical counterinsurgency theory. Politically, in many cases today, the counterinsurgent represents revolutionary change, while the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier — a political relationship opposite to that envisaged in classical counterinsurgency. The problem of weaning these fighters away from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting modernization, does somewhat resemble pacification in traditional counterinsurgency.

But it also echoes colonial campaigns For the most part, however, and in his explanations here, Kilcullen appears to leave out the "heart" of the "hearts and minds" matters -- to wit: the more-specific issue around which these conflicts appear to revolve.

These such "classic" counter-insurgencies occurring, as Kilcullen notes, only from to about ? This, accordingly, being the era where pop-centric COIN theories both [a] originated and [b] found their relevance? Via this specific view which we might call "Kilcullen Counterinsurgency-Redux-enhanced?

In an effort to better understand the "hearts and minds" question, might we first attempt to recognize, and distinguish between, two different kinds of counterinsurgencies:. In the first instance above the "Hold What You Got" model the insurgents the local yokels and their supporters want to get rid of the established foreign expansionist powers, and their influence, and to, thereby, become able to order, organize and orient their lives more as -- they themselves -- choose.

This, of course, the established foreign expansionist powers seek to prevent. In the second instance above the "Get Some More" model the insurgents again, the indigenous folks and their supporters want to prevent the foreign expansionist powers from a gaining new footholds in their area and b using these new footholds to alter the indigenous folks way of life, way of governance, etc. This, of course, is exactly what the foreign expansionist powers, and specifically via their interventions, seek to accomplish.

Although this article is not about Syria, people who have been in and out the battleground know that the problem of «hearts and minds» there is too complex and complicated. It is very hard to work through all this fog of war and define who are the West's allies, friends, or simply less evil partners, but it is essential to do so.

A common basic set of rules should be established, and that is the hard - desperating hard - work of several commissions and committees that in Turkey, Jordan, Switzerland and Germany have been trying to gather actors to solve the underlying political problem. We obviously cannot accept on our side groups that promote global jihad, that attack civilians, that threaten the whole international system of nations states.

We also cannot take on board «local» jihadists as opposed to «global» ones that promise to repeat the crimes of the Assad regime, and announce they will rule without pluralism, elections, a constitution, civil rights, social justice, etc. Thirdly, we have to make «our» allies glue to precise ROE of not attacking civilians and non combatants,treat prisoners humanely, not exercising «symbolical» and unnecessary destruction, and not indulge in the use of forbidden weapons or unprovoked shelling or invasion of other countries.

In fourth place, we have to see if our «allies», selected through this Occam's Razor reasoning that has much more items, of course , can be better helped by armed means or others. And if by armed means, which? There is also not a big engagement of massive armored forces. Thirdly, TOW and Milan systems already present some hundreds in all Syria have been captured in large numbers by the AQ Nusra factions and, more sinister even, by Daesh.

So I guess that a combination of help has to be devised, but if we don't define first who to help nothing will come from our support, and this one will be totally counterproductive. There were of course, since , several previous essays to sketch a definition. Armed insurgencies are in general forms of extreme political conflict. So in any of the sides of the barricade you are IN or COIN you need to understand the fundamental political issue at stake.

There are also stages in fighting, where opponents may focus more on each other, or on the civilian landscape, on an holistic view of stakeholders, on the economy, on morals, on «ideology», media, etc.

Portugal fought insurrectional wars in Africa from to , in three theaters Guinea-Bissau, the toughest nut to crack, Mozambique and Angola , and discovered at its own cost that even when things seem solved militarily, they are not, if you don't deal with the key underlying political problem. IMO when we attempt to shape a strategic approach that offers a positive political outcome our military is unable to interlock with the intrigues of Byzantine governments and this failure means everything goes to shit.

Our parliamentary system, wherein the Executive Office dominates all elements of governance, produces Federal institutions manned by individuals who struggle to engage with Byzantine regimes such as Pakistan,Iran and the KSA.

When we attempt to hammer out an acceptable approach we have an unrealistic expectation that those with who we are negotiating are in a position to do what will benefit their position. This is often not the case. Needless to say our own concerns barely warrant an afterthought. In Pakistan, Iran and the KSA you have a shadow political entity that must be respected by the native and the outsider, if the hope is to shape binding decisions.

This duplicity is something many of us find extremely difficult to come to terms with. Certainly we have similar powerful nefarious entities impacting our own governance — my pet hate the MIC for example - but they as a general rule are forced to operate within the written laws of the land. In a Byzantine Court this restriction is not only absent but is considered extremely dangerous to the well-being of your courtly Prince - and by default the nation.

In countries such as Greece, Turkey, China and until recently Russia the Byzantines just wanted money. However in Pakistan, Iran and the KSA this political entity is dominated by a hard-right fascist element that enjoy money as much as they enjoy the power of armed mass violence. We for some stupid reason believe they are inspired by our own bizarre misunderstanding of Islam. IMO what we should be doing when we attempt to shape an effective strategy is reflect upon the political forces that gripped Germany and Japan in the s, prior to the emergence of the openly fascist regimes that plunged the globe into world war.

Within the military of both Pakistan,Iran and the KSA the Byzantine approach is deeply entrenched and gives a cognitive cohesion that some might recognize as Mission Command. All of us are bleeding out badly and we need to OODA it sooner rather than later. I admit that I love the vision of a TOW swarm. Two questions for those in the know. Aren't we still providing TOWs to the resistance? Why haven't we seen attacks on airfields and aircraft previously?

I suspect it may be a harder target than some may be thinking. As for strategic ends, good strategy is holistic and identifying the ends of your enemies, friends, and frienemies is critical for determining when you cooperate and when you compete.

In addition to head hunting we confused the mantra of through, by, and with as strategy. We're America, so of course everyone shares our interests, or so is the perception.

The reality is closer to your comments on the mafia earlier. I think we have to know what interests we want to protect and advance before we start proposing a strategy so we can assess risk and probability of success. The strategic assessment requires understanding the interests of others and how strong those interests are, so we can gauge the estimated level of support and resistance. Of course, these will change over time, so it must be a rolling assessment.

There is no risk to US military personnel and the Gulfies are funding it - you do know they have the money right? I mean to ask what more do you want? You have repeated often enough you believe the US has nothing to gain or lose by getting involved. So what is your problem? I appreciate any resentment at Raytheon making more money out of human misery - but that's another argument completely. Besides the units I have seen are marked with a Hughes ID plate which marks them as a 's purchase.

Your speculation as to the outcome is a matter of opinion - and with respect, we all have one of those. Where you and I differ is you consider what is currently happening to the civilian population in Syria as not worth doing anything about. Whilst it remained a purely Arab expression of revolutionary and resistance energy I tended to reluctantly agree with that position. However my position changed when the Persians and the Russians stuck their oar in. The inevitable result the fall of Assad of all that pent-up Arab political energy has now been thwarted.

IMHO as a consequence of this out-lander intervention we are facing a regional ground war between opponents armed with nuclear weapons and lunatic leadership on all sides. A TOW swarm offers a chance for the native populations to be pulled back from the abyss and that is why I believe it is worth a go.

What's this move intended to accomplish? Shusha was the key to the recent war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Now Baku wants to turn the fabled fortress town into a resort. By Elizabeth Dickinson. August 22, , PM. Elizabeth Dickinson is a Gulf-based member of the journalism collective Deca.

Foreign Policy. November 12, , AM. November 11, , PM. Trending 1. Blame Brussels. Why Ethiopia Should Trust the West. Fiona Hill: U. Latest Analysis. Given this arrogance, condescension, and flip-flopping between anti-Bolshevik factions, it is no surprise that the Allied forces found little local support. Even when individual soldiers gained the respect of locals, incompetence from their commanders soon erased all progress. On one occasion, Allied forces torched part of a village in retaliation for sniper attacks.

By the end, they had lost what support greeted them upon their arrival. Crucial factors were the disorganized nature of the war, local support for the Viet-Cong, and the difficulty in telling apart friend and foe.

The strategy involved providing security to villages, expanding access to services like electricity, and a propaganda campaign showing the Viet-Cong as merciless aggressors. However, the idea of providing security and denouncing the Viet-Cong was undermined by the behavior of American command, which often resorted to using extreme firepower to put down resistance. American commanders declared entire areas free-fire zones. Troops would round up villagers, burn their hooches and relocate them from their ancestral lands into squalid refugee camps.

The latest example of a largely failed hearts and minds campaign is the ongoing war in Iraq. During testimony before Congress in the lead up to the wars, several absurd claims were made. These included that Iraqis would readily accept US occupation, and that they would come forth with candies, kites, boom boxes, and smiles to greet the American liberators. As the United States pursued plans to rebuild or expand infrastructure in a bid to win over civilians, distrust in the occupying forces increased due to the growing length of the occupation.